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IS UNREASONABLE LEGISLATION UNCONSTI-
TUTIONAL?*
The United States Supreme Court upon several occasions
has decided that the due process clauses authorize the court to
declare that actions by other organs of government which the
court considers unreasonable' or arbitrary 2 are unconstitutional
even though they do not violate any procedural requirements of
the Constitution; and in addition to these cases in which gov-
ernmental action was declared invalid, there are a number of
other cases in which the court has either said or suggested that
such action would violate the due process provision if unrea-
*From Reeder, VALIDITY OF RATE REGULATIONS (copyright, 1913, by T.
& J. W. Johnson Co.), where many additional authorities will be cited.1In Eubank v. Richmond (1912) 226 U. S. I37, that was one of the
grounds upon which the court declared unconstitutional an ordinance relat-
ing to the establishment of a building line upon request of owners of
two-thirds of the abutting property. The decision seems to be clearly
unreasonable. In Adair v. United States (1908) 208 U. S. 161, that was one
of the grounds upon which the court declared unconstitutional a federal
statute which forbade interstate carriers and their officials to discharge
employees because of membership in labor organizations. In Lochner v.
New York (19o5) 198 U. S. 45, a law which limited the number of hours
of labor in bakeries, and in Lake S. & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Smith (1899) i73
U. S. 684, a state law which limited the charge for mileage tickets was
declared unconstitutional upon that ground.
'Adair v. United States (i9o8) 2o8 U. S. I6I, I75, i8o; Lochner v.
New York (igo5) 198 U. S. 45, 62; Missouri P. Ry. Co. v. Tucker (1913)
230 U. S. 340, 351. In Dobbins v. Los Angeles (i9o4) i95 U. S. 223,
reversing the decision of the highest state court, it declared that an ordi-
nance which changed the territorial limits within which gas works might
be erected was, under the circumstances disclosed, arbitrary and discrimi-
natory and, therefore, in violation of the due process provision. In saying
that the ordinance was arbitrary it is quite possible that the court meant
that there was not a sufficient reason for its enactment. In Scott v. McNeal
(0894) I54 U. S. 34, 45, where a state court which had jurisdiction to admin-
ister the estates of decedents exceeded that jurisdiction and administered
the estate of a person who was in fact alive, the Supreme Court quoted
with approval the statement in an earlier opinion that the due process
provision was intended "to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise
of the powers of government, unrestrained by the established principles of
private rights and distributive justice." The Supreme Court case in which
the language quoted, first appeared related simply to a question of pro-
cedure. See remarks on that language in 24 HARV. L. REv. 476, note. And
see discussion of Scott v. McNeal in Cunnius v. Reading School Dist.
(i9os) 198 U. S. 458.
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sonable 3 or arbitrary. The latter word is apparently used in
the instances which are cited 4 as meaning oppressive or unjust
or not based upon a sufficient reason.
This position requires careful examination, for it is incon-
sistent with numerous decisions by the court that it has no con-
stitutional right to inquire into the wisdom or justice of acts
by other organs of the federal government or by the states or
their organs of government; 5 and if followed out it would place
almost unlimited power in the hands of the federal judiciary,
'See, e. g., American L. Co. v. Zeiss (1911) 219 U. S. 47, 66, 67; House
v. Mayes (9IH) 219 U. S. 270, 284, 285; Brodnax v. Missouri (igI) 219
U. S. 285, 292, 293; Griffith v. Connecticut (191o) 218 U. S. 563, 569;
Ling Sti Fan v. United States (191o) 218 U. S. 302, 311; Watson v. Mary-
land (1910) 218 U. S. 173, 178; Lemieux v. Young (1909) 211 U. S. 489,
496; Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. North Carolina Corp. Comm. (19o7) 206 U. S.
I, 2o; Schmidinger v. Chicago (1913) 226 U. S. 578, 588; Missouri P. Ry.
Co. v. Kansas (IgIo) 216 U. S. 262, 274, 275, 276; West C. S. R. Co. v.
People (i9o6) 201 U. S. 5o6, 526; Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. People
(19o6) 260 U. S. 561, 592, 593; Cunnius v. Reading School Dist. (19o5)
198 U. S. 458, 476; Jacobson v. Massachusetts (19o5) 197 U. S. 11, 28, 29.
Compare Red "C" Oil Co. v. North Carolina (1912) 222 U. S. 380, 394;
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. (1911) 220 U. S. 107, 158, 167, i6g; Chicago, B. &
Q. R. Co. v. McGuire (1911) 219 U. S. 549, 569; Patton v. Brady (19o2)
184 U. S. 6o8, 623.
' See, e. g., Barrett v. Indiana (1913) 229 U. S. 26, 29; Missouri P. Ry.
Co. v. Kansas (191o) 216 U. S. 262, 214, 275, 276; New York v. Hesterberg
(198o) 211 U. S. 31, 39; Interstate Coin. Comm. v. Union P. R. Co. (1912)
222 U. S. 541, 547, 553; German A. Ins. Co. v. Hale (1911) 219 U. S. 307,
316; Brodnax v. ,issouri (1911) 219 U. S. 285, 292, 293; American L.
Co. v. Zeiss I) 219 U. S. 47, 66; Ling Su Fan v. United States' (191o)
218 U. S./,6, 311; McLean v. Arkansas (1909) 211 U. S. 539, 547, 548;
West C. S. R. Co. v. People (19o6) 201 U. S. 5o6, 524, 526; People v.
Van de Carr (19o5) 199 U. S. 552, 563; California R. Co. v. Sanitary R.
Works (19o5) ig9 U. S. 306, 320; Cunnius v. Reading School Dist. (1o5)
198 U. S. 458, 476; Jacobson v. Massachusetts (19o) 197 U. S. II, 28;
Lawton v. Steele (1894) 152 U. S. 133, 14o. And see Metropolis T. Co. v.
Chicago (1913) 228 U. S. 61, 69; Quong Wing v. Kirkendall (1912) 223
U. S. 59, 62; Mutual L. Co. v. Martell (911) 222 U. S. 225, 234; Chicago,
R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Arkansas (1911) 219 U. S. 453, 465, 466; Hodgson v.
Vermont (1897) 168 U. S. 262, 272; Barbier v. Connolly (1885) 113 U. S.
27, 31; United States v. Cruikshank (1875) 92 U. S. 542, 554; Welch v.
Swasey (1909) 214 U. S. 91, 1o5. And the following cases which deal with
the question of procedure: Bank of Columbia v. Okely (1819) 4 Wheat
235, 244; Caldwell v. Texas (i8gi) 137 U. S. 692, 697, 698; Kentucky U.
Co. v. Kentucky (1911) 219 U. S. 140, 161; Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v.
Turnipseed (1910) 219 U. S. 35, 43; concurring opinion in Davidson v.
New Orleans (1877) 96 U. S. 97, lO7. On Bank of Columbia v. Okely,
supra, see 24 HARv. L. REv. 476, note. With the cases in the present note
compare Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. (1911) 220 U. S. 107, 158.
'See Reeder, Constitutional and Extra-constitutional Restraints, 61 UxI-
vFRsiTY op PENNSyLVAmA LAW REVIW, 441.
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and under it the Fourteenth Amendment would radically change
the relations which before its adoption existed between the
state and federal governments and between both governments
and the people. 6
The court has also said or suggested in several cases that
it may pass upon the necessity for legislative 7 or administrative 8
action, although such statements and suggestions also are clearly
inconsistent with the position which the court has taken in other
cases.
9
'The court has declared repeatedly that the Amendment did not bring
about such a change. As was said by Knox, J., in his separate opinion in
Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia (1853) 21 Pa. 147, i86, 187, "There
is, to my mind, great danger in recognizing the existence of a power in
the judiciary to annul legislative action, without some fixed rule by which
such power is to be measured. Our opinions are so diversified and varied,
that what to one mind may seem clearly right and proper, to another will
appear to be fraught with imminent danger. If we have not a certain
standard by which to test the constitutionality of legislative enactments;
if each judge is to be governed by his own convictions of what is right or
otherwise, I fear that restraints upon judicial, rather than upon legislative
action, will be demanded by a people ever jealous of the accumulation of
power in the hands of the few." Clifford, J., dissenting, said in Loan Ass'n
v. Topeka (1874) 20 Wall. 655, 66.9, "Courts cannot nullify an act of the
state legislature on the vague ground that they think it opposed to a general
latent spirit supposed to pervade or underlie the constitution, where neither
the terms nor the implications of the instrument disclose any such restriction.
Such a power is denied to the courts, because to concede it would be to
make the courts sovereign over both the constitution and the people, and
convert the government into a judicial despotism." See also Boudin, Govern-
ment by Judiciary, 26 Pol. Sci. Quar. 238, especially latter part of that
article.
'Lochner v. New York (1905) 198 U. S. 45, 56; Lawton v. Steele (1894)
152 U. S. 133, 137; House v. Mayes (1911) 219 U. S. 270, 282, 284, 285;
Welch v. Swasey (199o) 214 U. S. 91, 1o5; Brodnax vr. Missouri (1911)
219 U. S. 285, 292, 293; Engel v. O'Malley (1911) 219 U. S. 128, 136; Noble
State Bank v. Haskell (1911) 219 U. S. 104, 113; California R. Co. v.
Sanitary R. Works (I9O5) 199 U. S. 306, 318; Gardner v. Michigan (1905)
199 U. S. 325, 332; Jacobson v. Massachusetts (i9o5) 197 U. S. II, 28;
Gundling v. Chicago (igoo) 177 U. S. 183, 188.
'Washington v. Fairchild (1912) 224 U. S. 510.
'In McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 4 Wheat. 316, 423, without refer-
ence to the Fifth Amendment, Marshall, C. J., says concerning legislation by
Congress, which differs from state legislatures in that it has only powers
expressly or impliedly granted, that "where the law is not prohibited, and
is really calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to the government,
to undertake here to inquire into the degree of its necessity, would be to
pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on
legislative ground." And in Oceanic Nay. Co. v. Stranahan (igog) 214
U. S. 320, 34o, the court, by White, J., speaks of "the assumption that it is
within the-competency of judicial authority to control legislative action as
to subjects over which there is complete legislative authority, on the theory
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In support of these positions of the court there is very little
reasoning expressed in the opinions, but from citations and
quotations in a number of those opinions it seems clear that the
court is often basing such decisions under the due process clauses
upon other lines of decision which the court deems to be either
directly in point or else analogous. We shall, therefore, inquire
into the bearing of those other lines of decision upon the ques-
tions under consideration.
Let us first note that the fact that English courts and those
which applied state law 10 have declared invalid ordinances
which the municipalities were not expressly empowered to make
which the courts considered unreasonable 11 does not justify the
Supreme Court in inquiring into the reasonableness of an ordi-
that there was no necessity calling for the exertion of legislative power.
. The constitutional right of Congress to enact such legislation is the
sole measure by which its validity is to be determined by the courts. The
suggestion that if this view be applied, grave abuses may arise from the
mistaken or wrongful exertion by the legislative department of its authority,
but intimates that if the legislative power be permitted its full sway within
its Constitutional sphere, harm and wrong will follow, and therefore it
behooves the judiciary to apply a corrective by exceeding its own authority.
But as was pointed out in Cary v. Curtis (1845) 3 How. 236, and as has
been often since emphasized by this court, McCray v. United States (19o4)
195 U. S. 27, the proposition but mistakenly assumes that the courts can
alone be safely entrusted with power, and that hence it is their duty to
unlawfully exercise prerogatives which they have no right to exert, upon
the assumption that wrong must be done to prevent wrong being accom-
plished." See also District of Columbia v. Brooke (igog) 214 U. S. 138,
15o; The Lottery Case-Champion v. Ames (i9o3) 188 U. S. 321, 358;
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co. (1913) 229 U. S. 53, 62; McDermott
v. Wisconsin (913) 228 U. S. 115, 128; Hoke v. United States (1913) 227
U. S. 3o8, 323; Minneapolis etc. R. Co. v. Railroad Comm. of Wisconsin
(908) 136 Wis. 146, i6o, i16 N. W. 905, 910, 17 L. R. A. N. S. 821, 829.
Compare United States v. Joint T. Ass'n (1898) 171 U. S. 505, 571, where
the statement of the court is inconclusive; and note in 17 L. R. A. 838.
"0L e., state courts and also federal courts when the latter acquired
jurisdiction by reason of the diverse citizenship of the parties.
'See Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.) §589, et seq.; McQuillin,
Municipal Ordinances, §181, et seq.; McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, §724,
et seq.; Paul v. Gloucester County (1888) 50 N. J. L. 585, 6oo; New 0. &
N. W. R. Co. v. Vidalia (19o6) 117 La. 56o; and also People v. Daniels
(188g) 6 Utah, 288, 292, 293, which points out that territories are in the
same position as municipalities in this respect. It seems that originally the
rule was a qualifiiation to the admission that municipalities possessed im-
plied powers, and was not a limitation concerning thepropriety of exer-
cises of express powers, and that the extent to which the rule is at present
frequently applied in this country is due to later usurpations Qf power by
the courts.
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nance upon appeal from a state court, 12 nor does it by itself show
anything as to the bearing of the due process provision upon leg-
islation. It has not been shown, by reference to those clauses
or to any other clauses, that the men who adopted the Consti-
tution sought to place Congress in the same relation to the
federal judiciary as municipal governments stood towards the
local courts; 13 and they certainly did not place the state legis-
latures in that position; for while Congress is somewhat like
such municipal governments in that it possesses only powers
which have been bestowed upon it, expressly or impliedly, a
state legislature has all powers not denied to it by the federal or
state constitution, and the state itself, in adopting a constitution,
has all powers not denied to it by the federal Constitution. 14
It is possible that the decisions concerning the reasonable-
ness of ordinances may show by way of analogy that the
appropriate courts may pass upon the reasonableness of admin-
istrative regulations under some circumstances, depending upon
the terms of the grant 'of power to the administrative organ.
But those decisions do not seem to have any bearing whatever
upon state or federal legislation. -
The court has also said that in view of the due process
provision a governmental action cannot be a valid exercise of
the police power unless it is reasonable; 15 and in reaching this
"Railroad Co. v. Richmond (1877) 96 U. S. 52r, 528. Consider, how-
ever, the character of the citations in Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905) 197
U. S. 11, 28; and see Yick Wo. v. Hopkins (1886) 1i8 U. S. 356; and dis-
senting opinion in Slaughter House Cases (1872) 16 Wall. 36, io8. Acts
by municipalities which are in excess of authority from the state do not
for that reason violate the due process provision: Owensboro W. Co. v.
Owensboro (igo6) 200 U. S. 38. The United States Supreme Court declares
that it is its duty to follow the interpretations which have been given to the
state constitutions and the state statutes by the state courts.
"" Had they done so, it seems that the rule would have related only to
the implied powers of Congress.
"'See City of New York v. Miln (1837) I Pet. 1o2, 139; Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee (1816) 1 Wheat 304, 325; Sturges v. Crowninshield (i819)
4 Wheat. 122, 192-193; Sutherland, Notes on the United States Constitution,
677.
"Eubank v. Richmond (1912) 226 U. S. 137, 144; Lochner v. New
York (19o5) 198 U. S. 45, 53, 56; Lake S. & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Smith (1899)
173 U. S. 684, 689, 691; House v. Mayes (1911) 219 U. S. 270, 282; Chicago,
B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. People (9o6) 2o U. S. 561, 592, 593; New York v.
Hesterberg (i9o8) 211 U. S. 31, 39. See also McLean v. Arkansas (1909) 211
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conclusion it has referred to cases which arose under other pro-
visions of the Constitution and in which it had considered the
occasion for governmental action in order to determine there-
from whether such action were within the police power of a
state. 16  Such references to decisions under other provisions of
the Constitution are in point if the term "police power" is used
in the same sense in all cases. 
17
In the cases which arose under other provisions of the
Constitution the term "police power" is apparently used to
denote a power the existence of which limits the scope of pro-
visions of the Constitution. The court recognizes the fact that
it cannot carry out a constitution "with mathematical nicety to
logical extremes." 18 It does not always interpret stringently
the limitations upon state action which are contained in the
Constitution."9 Instead of so doing, it inquires into the char-
U. S. 539, 54; Welch v. Swasey (1909) 214 U. S. 91, O5; Jacobson v.
Massachusetts (19o5) 197 U. S. ii, 25, 28; Gundling v. Chicago (i9oo) 177
U. S. 183, i88; Holden v. Hardy (1898) 169 U. S. 366, 392, 395, 398; Lawton v.
Steele (1894) 152 U. S. 133, 137; German A. Ins. Co. v. Hale (1911) 219
U. S. 307, 316.
"' Note the references in the following cases which arose under the due
process provisions to cases which were decided under other provisions of
the Constitution: Lawton v. Steele (1894) 152 U. S. 133, 137; German A.
Ins. Co. v. Hale (1911) 219 U. S. 307, 316, 317; California R. Co. v. Sani-
tary R. Works (i9o5) 199 U. S. 3o6, 318, 319; Jacobson v. Massachusetts
(19o5) 197 U. S. Ii, 25, 28; Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. People (19o6) 200
U. S. 561, 584, 585.
1 But see Hand, The Commodities Clause and the Fifth Amendment,
22 HARv. L. Rxv. 250, 259; Blayney, The Term "Police Power," 59 CENT. L.
J. 486, 489.
' "You cannot carry a constitution out with mathematical nicety to log-
ical extremes. If you could, we should never have heard of the police
power": Paddell v. New York (1908) 211 U. S. 446, 45o. See also Noble
State Bk. v. Haskell (1911) 219 U. S. 104, IiO; Hudson C. W. Co. v.
McCarter (19o8) 209 U. S. 349, 355, 357; Danforth v. Groton W. Co. (19oi)
178 Mass. 472, 476, 477; Dunbar v. Boston & P. R. Co. (19o2) I8 Mass. 383.
Holmes, 3., speaking for himself, said in Interstate C. S. Ry. Co. v. Com-
monwealth (9o7) 207 U. S. 79, 86, 87, "I hesitatingly agree with the state
court that the requirement may be justified under what commonly is called
the police power. The obverse way of stating this power in the sense in
Which I am using the phrase would be that constitutional rights like others
are matters of degree and that the great constitutional provisions for the
protection of property are not to be pushed to a logical extreme, but must
be taken to permit the infliction of some fractional and relatively small
losses without compensation, for some at least of the purposes of whole-
some legislation." See also cases there cited.
a'The court, in cases arising under the impairment of contract clause,
has declared that, in spite of supposed contracts, a state may enact legis-
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acter of the legislation and it says that the legislation which it
upholds is within the police power of the state.
But the term "police power" is also used in a broader sense
to denote all the power of government which the states did not
expressly or impliedly 20 surrender by the adoption of the Con-
stitution, a power which has no bounds except those imposed
by the Constitution.
21
lation to secure the safety or to protect the health or the morals of its
citizens: Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Miller (IgI1) 221 U. S. 408, 414; Northern
P. Ry. Co. v. State (19o8) 208 U. S. 583, 596, 597, 598; and cases cited there
and in Patterson, The United States and the States Under the Constitu-
tion, (2d Ed.), p. 178. And the court for a long time held, and to some ex-
tent still holds, that the state may enact such and similai legislation, although
it affects interstate commerce, where Congress has not expressly shown a de-
termination that the commerce should be free from state regulation: Chicago,
R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Arkansas (911) 219 U. S. 453; and cases cited there
and in Patterson, ubi supra, chap. 4. See also Second Employers' Liability
Cases-Mondou v. New Y., N. H. & H. R. Co. (1912) 223 U. S. I, 54, 55;
compare Adams Ex. Co. v. Kentucky (I9o9) 214 U. S. 218, 222; Leisy v.
Hardin (189o) 135 U. S. 1oo. So also it has said that in spite of the impair-
ment of contract clause a state may make changes in statutes of limitation
affecting existing rights of action if the time allowed before the bar takes
effect is not palpably unreasonable: Terry v. Anderson (187/) 95 U. S.
628; see also Kentucky U. Co. v. Kentucky (1911) 219 U. S. 140, 156, 157.
While the court holds that the equal protection provision protects against
discriminatory legislation, it also holds that a state in legislating may make
classifications which are not unreasonable: Haller v. Nebraska (1907) 205
U. S. 34; Bacon v. Walker (19o7) 204 U. S. 311; St. Mary's F. A. P. Co.
v. West Virginia (19o6) 203 U. S. 183; Campbell v. California (19o6) 20o
U. S. 87, 95; Plessy v. Ferguson (I896) 163 U. S. 537, 550; and see Second
Employers' Liability Cases-Mondou v. New Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., supra.-
On the subject of this note see also Martin v. District of Columbia (19o7)
205 U. S. 135, 139; Allen v. Riley (19o6) 203 U. S. 347; Woods v. Carl
(19o6) 203 U. S. 358; Railroad Co. v. Fuller (1873) 17 Wall. 56o, 567, 568;
Escanaba & L. M. T. Co. v. Chicago (1882) 1O7 U. S. 678; Lake S. & M.
S. Ry. Co. v. Ohio (i899) 173 U. S. 285; Territory of New Mexico v.
Denver & R. G. R. Co. (19o6) 203 U. S. 38, 55; Asbell v. Kansas (19o8)
2g U. S. 251; Morgan's S. Co. v. Louisiana (1886) 1I8 U. S. 455, 462, 464;
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky (1896) i61 U. S. 577, 695; New York v.
Hesterberg (i9o8) 211 U. S. 31. Compare North Dakota v. Tanson (191o)
215 U. S. 515, 525.
"For example, the court holds that the grant to Congress of power
over interstate commerce constitutes a restraint upon the state governments.
'See: Noble State Bank v. Haskell (1911) 219 U. S. 104, ii; Chicago,
B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. People (i9o6) 200 U. S. 561, 592; New 0. G. Co.
v. Louisiana L. Co. (885) 115 U. S. 65o, 661; License Cases (1847) 5
How. 5o4, 583; House v. Mayes (1911) 219 U. S. 270, 282; German A. L.
Co. v. Hale (1911) 219 U. S. 307, 317; Keller v. United States (igog) 213
U. S. 138; Bacon v. Walker (i9o7) 204 U. S. 311, 317; Halter v. Nebraska
(19O) 2o5 U. S. 34, 4o; Cincinnati, I. & W. Ry. Co. v. Connersville (19Io)
218 U. S. 336, 344; Northwestern N. L. I. Co. v. Riggs (19o6) 203 U. S.
243, 253; Western T. Ass'n v. Greenberg (1907) 204 U. S. 3A9, 363; Mutual
L Ass'n v. Martell (191i) 222 U. S. 225. The term is also used to ddnbte
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And, of course, the fact that the court has inquired whether
legislation was within the police power of the state, as that term
is used in its narrower significance, does not necessarily show
that the court should inquire into the necessity or propriety of
legislation in all cases. The decisions concerning the police
power to which we have referred and in which the term is used
in its narrower sense, do not justify the court in inquiring into
the character of legislation and naming instances in which it
will and instances in which it will not permit legislation, unless
some express or implied restraints upon governmental action are
involved.
2 2
Those decisions may well be in point in cases arising under
the due process clauses in which questions of procedure are
involved. They may show the degree of strictness with which
that provision of the Constitution should be enforced. But
before we can say that they are in point in cases where the due
process provision is invoked in controversies concerning ques-
tions of substantive law, we must first show that if stringently
applied the provision might be given a sweeping effect and held
to provide broadly that the legislature may not cause any person
to lose his life, liberty or property. If we could say that, the
decisions to which we have referred would seem to show by way
of analogy that the due process provision was not to be applied
stringently where in the opinion of the court the legislature was
properly guarding the welfare of the citizens.
Did those who adopted the clauses intend that as a general
rule they should have such an effect? Did they intend to forbid
the legislature to change rules of law? Such a change usually
affects rights which persons possessed before the law was
enacted; and it affects them without any prior judicial proceed-
ings. Compliance with the law may mean a recognition that
rights have already been altered; and the enforcement of the
the residuary sovereignty of the state minus such ordinary powers as by
constant use have acquired a separate identity and a definite name, as
"taxation," "eminent domain," etc.: Hastings, Police Power of the State,
39 Proc. Am. Phil. Soc. 405, 414.
" In support of this statement see Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania (1898)
171 U. S. i, 16.
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law has that meaning. Are the due process clauses violated
when changes in the rights which persons theretofore possessed
are made before there have been judicial proceedings and the
judiciary is called upon simply to recognize and enforce the
changes in the law?
It is true that as a general rule the government may not lay
a heavy hand upon a person until he has had his day in court.
But it does not follow that the rules of law which the court is
to apply are to be determined then for the first time or that they
must be made by that tribunal. On the contrary, we know that
those who adopted the Amendments intended that as a general
rule governmental commands should be made and enforced by
different organs of government-an intention which was shown
by their custom of distributing the governmental powers, both
of the federal and of the several state governments, among three
departments of government. The custom of so distributing
governmental powers was so general and continued for so long
a time after the adoption of the due process provision that we
cannot readily adopt a construction of the due process provision
which is inconsistent with that custom. We must recognize the
power of the legislature to make rules of law. And the power
to make the law includes the power to change the law.
On the other hand, those who adopted the constitutions
clearly intended that the power to enforce the law should not
include the power to pass upon legislative questions. There is
nothing in the suggestion that governmental commands when
made otherwise than by the tribunal which is to enforce them
are subject to tests similiar to those which in the absence of legis-
lation that tribunal would apply to the acts of individuals. The
legislature may unquestionably change the law; and when it does
so it is the clear and inevitable duty of the courts to enforce the
law as enacted by the legislature unless that law violates the
Constitution.
Moreover, as was pointed out in a former article,23 there
are strong reasons for the opinion that the due process pro-
vision refers merely to those deprivations which are usually made
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200 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
by way of punishment. And the establishment of a rule of
law could hardly be considered the making of such a deprivation.
In short, it cannot be said that as a general rule the due
process provision forbids the legislature to enact any law the
enforcement of which would cause any person to lose his life,
liberty or property. As a consequence, we cannot base upon
the cases to which the court has referred 24 the broad statement
that by virtue of the due process provision any legislation which
affects individuals is unconstitutional if it is unreasonable. And
so, while it may be said correctly that the court may inquire
into the justification for exercises of the police power, this
statement is true only when the term "police power" is given its
more restricted meaning, and it is not true when the term is
used in its broader sense.
It is quite possible that the assertion that cou-ts may de-
clare invalid legislation which they consider unreasonable, while
it claims the support of the due process provision, is based in
large measure upon the idea that legislation which conflicts with
natural justice is void.2 5  We have, however, already observed
that a court is not justified in refusing to enforce legislation
upon the ground that it is not in accordance with natural jus-
tice.
26
The court has also referred 27 to cases in which the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts has passed upon the propriety of state
legislation. But that position was taken by the state court
because of a provision in the state constitution which does not
appear in the federal Constitution 2 8 so that the cases from
Massachusetts are not in point.
"See note i6, supra.
"See Boudin, Government by Judiciary, 26 Pol. Sci. Quar. 238, 265. Sir
Frederick Pollock (The History of the Law of Nature, I COL. L. REv. 29, 30)
quotes St. Germain's statement (Doctor and Student, Dialogue I, Chap. 5) that
where the canonist or civilian would speak of the law of nature, the common
lawyer speaks of reason, and says: "Once pointed out, the analogy is obviously
just, and a real connection is at least probable, for we are not to suppose that
the judges and serjeants never knew any more of what the canonists were
doing than is disclosed by the Year Books."
"See note 5, supra.
"See, e. g., Lawton v. Steele (j894) 152 U. S. 133, 137.
"The Massachusetts Supreme Court, owing to the formula by which
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As we have already noted,2 9 the court has said that the due
process provision forbids arbitrary governmental action. The
word "arbitrary," however, is decidedly indefinite. The court
apparently means that a governmental action cannot rest for its
validity simply upon the pleasure of the organ of government
which has taken that action; but we cannot say with positive-
ness that the court is making a statement which is more definite
than that.
Such a position the court certainly ought to take in some
cases. It should say that, in view of the constitutional objections
to delegations of legislative power which usually exist, an
administrative body as a general rule cannot exercise, even under
color of a legislative grant of power, a wide range of discretion,
but that it may act only in accordance with pre-established
rules; 30 and the court should say that in view of the due process
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment such a requirement
when based upon the state constitution may be enforced in the
federal courts.
But the Supreme Court does not take that position. It
declares, rather, that the due process requirement does not
authorize the federal courts to enforce compliance with any of
the provisions of the state constitutions, as such. And instead of
limiting its statement the court seems to take, instead, the posi-
tion that no organ of government may exercise arbitrary power.
The court apparently means to say, at times at least, that the
due process provision forbids governmental acts which are
oppressive or unjust or not based upon a sufficient reason.
We have already seen, however, that the court cannot
properly declare that the acts of other organs of government are
unconstitutional simply because they bring about results which
power is vested in the Massachusetts constitution in the legislature to pass
'all manner of wholesome and reasonable' laws, had never ceased to describe
the police power, even when according to it the broadest possible field of
operation, as a power of 'reasonable' legislation": Corwin, Due Process of
Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARv. L. Rnv. 46o, 478. See also Corwin, The.
Establishment of Judicial Review, 9 MIcH. L. Rav. 283, 315.
"See page 191, supra.
I See article by author-Rate Regulation as Affected by the Distribution
of Governmental Powers in the Constitution, 57 UNvaRSIn' OF IVENISYtVANIA
LAw Ravizw, 59.
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are in the opinion of the court clearly unjustifiable from an eco-
nomic or a social standpoint.3
And the court certainly cannot take the position that the
judiciary possesses the right to review all the actions of other
organs of government, As Mr. Sedgwick has well said, "If it
is meant to assert that there should be no absolute power in each
department of government, then it is so far from being true,
that, on the contrary, without such power no government could
regularly exist an hour; all would be conflict and confusion. It
cannot be denied that, practically, despotic power must some-
where exist in every system that assumes to order and regularity.
Appeals must terminate, controversies must cease, discussions
must end, and the business of life proceed. To effect this, it
is indispensable that there must be somewhere lodged, in regard
to the operations of every department of government, a supreme,
inexorable power whose decision is conclusive; and whether the
system be that of a monarchy, an oligarchy, a democracy, or
that mixed form under which we live, such power will always
be found. In the very case before us, what is the result Of the
reasoning but to claim for the judiciary the very absolutism
which is denied to the legislature? If the statute is conclusive,
then the legislature is absolute ;-granted. But if the judgment
of the court is final,-and to be efficacious it must be so,-then
you encounter the same difficulty at only one remove. '32 "The
law," as was said by the Supreme Court of Michigan,3" "must
leave the final decision upon every claim and every controversy
somewhere, and when that decision has been made, it must be
accepted as correct."
Robert P. Reeder.
Philadelphia.
' 1See note 5, supra.
' Sedgwick, Interpretation and Construction of Statutory and Constitu-
tional Law (2d Ed.) 154.
" Sutherland v. Governor (1874) 29 Mich. 320, 330, 331.
